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In 1973, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized the community
caretaking exception to the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against
unreasonable searches and seizures. As its name suggests, the exception
acknowledges that police officers act not merely as law enforcers, but also
as community caretakers, rendering aid to those in need, and acting to
protect both people and property from harm. As originally conceived, the
community caretaking exception was limited to situations involving
automobiles where police were performing functions totally divorced
from law enforcement. Over the years, courts have expanded the
exception considerably. Police officers who suspect a crime has taken
place may now search without a warrant as long as those officers—or a
court—can articulate an objectively reasonable basis for community
caretaking after the fact. Worse still, many jurisdictions allow these
warrantless searches in homes. What began as a reasonable and limited
exception has become a mechanism that allows police officers—with the
courts at times acting as their willing accomplices—to use false concern
for citizens’ welfare as a subterfuge to enter their homes at will to
investigate crime. This Comment urges the U.S. Supreme Court to use the
recently revived physical trespass standard to reshape the community
caretaking exception and restore to their preeminent level the Fourth
Amendment guarantees that once protected our hearths and homes.
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1. Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 434–36 (1973).
2. Id. at 436.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 436–37.
6. Id. at 437.
7. State v. Dombrowski, 44 Wis. 2d 486, 492, 171 N.W.2d 349, 352–53 (1969).
8. Id. at 493–94.
9. See id. at 496.
10. Dombrowski v. Cady, 319 F. Supp. 530, 530 (E.D. Wis. 1970), rev’d, 471 F.2d 280
(7th Cir. 1972), rev’d, 413 U.S. 433 (1973).
11. Cady, 413 U.S. at 441, 448.
12. Id. at 441–43.
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On September 11, 1969, Chester Dombrowski drove his rented
1
vehicle off the road outside West Bend, Wisconsin. While responding
to the accident, local police learned that Dombrowski was a Chicago
2
police officer. Dombrowski appeared intoxicated and was arrested for
3
drunken driving. Because of the injuries Dombrowski sustained in the
4
accident, the police transported him to the local hospital. Dombrowski
lapsed into a coma, during which time an officer searched his car in an
5
effort to locate Dombrowski’s duty revolver. The officer was unable to
locate the revolver, but when he opened the locked trunk of the car, he
found clothing, a nightstick, a floor mat, and a towel—all of which were
6
covered in blood. Dombrowski was subsequently charged with first7
degree murder. During the trial, he objected to the admission of the
evidence recovered from the trunk because the officer obtained it
8
The Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld the
without a warrant.
conviction on appeal, holding that when the officer opened the locked
9
car trunk, it was not a search. While in prison, Dombrowski brought a
habeas corpus action in federal court again arguing that the evidence
10
was acquired in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. His case
made it to the U.S. Supreme Court, and the Court held that the search
was reasonable because the police officer was exercising a “community
caretaking function[], totally divorced from the detection, investigation,
or acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal statute,”
when the officer entered the locked trunk to secure Dombrowski’s
11
This case, Cady v. Dombrowski, gave rise to what has
property.
become known as the “community caretaking” exception to the Fourth
Amendment prohibition against warrantless—and thus unreasonable—
12
searches.
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The community caretaking exception provides that “a police officer
serving as a community caretaker to protect persons and property may
13
be constitutionally permitted to perform warrantless searches.” The
concept of “‘[c]ommunity caretaking’ denotes a wide range of everyday
police activities undertaken to aid those in danger of physical harm, to
preserve property, or []to [‘]create and maintain a feeling of security in
14
the community.’” In Cady, for example, police were acting to preserve
Dombrowski’s property and protect the public from the danger of an
unsecured weapon when they searched his vehicle for his service
15
revolver. When the community caretaking exception was established,
16
it was strictly limited to vehicle searches. However, that limitation did
not hold and the community caretaking exception was eventually
expanded beyond vehicle searches and into homes, as illustrated by a
17
recent Wisconsin case.
On August 24, 2006, Milwaukee police received an anonymous tip
that Juiquin Pinkard and his girlfriend “appeared to be sleeping” near
“cocaine, money and a scale” in an apartment, the door to which was
18
ajar. The officer who received the tip “was concerned” about Pinkard
and his girlfriend, so he contacted a member of the police gang unit,
who later testified that he thought the description of the apartment
19
“sounded like a drug house.” When he and four other officers went to
check on the couple, they knocked on the door, which was “three20
quarters open,” but received no answer. After only thirty to forty-five
seconds, the gang unit entered the apartment and soon located the
21
couple asleep—along with drugs, cash, and a handgun. The Wisconsin
Supreme Court upheld Pinkard’s conviction for drug possession, holding
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13. State v. Pinkard, 2010 WI 81, ¶ 14, 327 Wis. 2d 346, 785 N.W.2d 592, cert. denied, 131
S. Ct. 1001 (2011).
14. Debra Livingston, Police, Community Caretaking, and the Fourth Amendment, 1998
U. CHI. LEGAL F. 261, 272 (1998) (alteration in original) (quoting STANDARDS FOR
CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 1-2.2 (1980)).
15. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
16. Cady, 413 U.S. at 441–43, 447–48.
17. Pinkard, 2010 WI 81, ¶ 27.
18. Brief of Plaintiff-Respondent at 7, State v. Pinkard, 2010 WI 81, 327 Wis. 2d 346, 785
N.W.2d 592 (No. 2008AP1204-CR), 2009 WL 3443175 at *5.
19. Brief of Plaintiff-Respondent, supra note 18, at 7. Despite their concern, officers did
not bring emergency medical personnel with them to the apartment, and they later testified
that they did not believe there was a medical emergency at the time they entered the home.
Pinkard, 2010 WI 81, ¶¶ 85–88.
20. Brief of Plaintiff-Respondent, supra note 18, at 7–8.
21. Id. at 8–9.

34306-mqt_97-1 Sheet No. 68 Side A

01/13/2014 11:22:05

HELDING 10 (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

THE COMMUNITY CARETAKING EXCEPTION

12/3/2013 1:58 PM

127

that the community caretaking exception applied to the search of his
22
home. This holding expanded the community caretaking exception by
changing it from a justification for inventory searches of vehicles,
“totally divorced” from investigation, to a justification for warrantless
home entries and searches, conducted for the mixed motives of
23
Under the aegis of community
caretaking and investigation.
caretaking, police, originally allowed to act only for the protection of
people and property in vehicles, could now search a home for evidence
of a crime without a warrant as long as they had some level of concern
for the welfare of the suspect—or some concern could be articulated
24
after the fact.
Dissenting in Cady, a prescient Justice Brennan seemed to warn the
majority that the community caretaking exception was not quite as
benign as it thought, calling the exception a “serious departure from
25
established Fourth Amendment principles.” Thirty-seven years later,
Wisconsin Supreme Court Justice Ann Walsh Bradley issued a similar
26
warning to her colleagues as they added Wisconsin, the very state that
created the Cady community caretaking exception, to the growing list of
jurisdictions that reject the limitation of the exception to vehicles and
27
use it instead to justify the warrantless search of a home. The justices’
warnings have gone unheeded and, consequently, the potential
problems about which they warned have become reality. While the
Third, Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have continued to limit the
28
application of the community caretaking exception to automobiles, the
Fourth, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits, and an increasing number of state

01/13/2014 11:22:05
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22. Pinkard, 2010 WI 81, ¶¶ 16, 28.
23. Id. (“[W]e have concluded that under certain circumstances a reasonably exercised
community caretaker function may permit a warrantless entry into a home . . . .”); see also
infra Part II.C.2.e.
24. See, e.g., infra notes 176–78, 265 and accompanying text.
25. Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 454 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“I can only
conclude, therefore, that what the Court does today in the name of an investigative
automobile search is in fact a serious departure from established Fourth Amendment
principles.”).
26. Pinkard, 2010 WI 81, ¶ 66 (Bradley, J., dissenting) (“I fear that today’s close call will
become tomorrow’s norm.”).
27. See id. ¶ 20 (majority opinion) (allowing warrantless entry to homes when “the
community caretaker function was reasonably exercised under the totality of the
circumstances”); infra Parts II.C.1–2.
28. Megan Pauline Marinos, Comment, Breaking and Entering or Community
Caretaking? A Solution to the Overbroad Expansion of the Inventory Search, 22 GEO. MASON
U. C.R. L.J. 249, 264 (2012).
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II. BACKGROUND
A. Fourth Amendment Rights
The Fourth Amendment guarantees people the “right . . . to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
31
searches.” This guarantee does not prohibit all searches, just those

C M
Y K

01/13/2014 11:22:05

29. See infra Parts II.C.1–2.
30. See generally Marinos, supra note 28 (proposing a “community caretaking warrant”
as a solution).
31. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. We are also protected from unreasonable “seizures,” id.,
but the focus of this Comment is on the expansion of the community caretaking doctrine to

34306-mqt_97-1 Sheet No. 68 Side B

courts, have expanded the exception to allow for the warrantless
29
searches of homes.
This Comment explores that expansion, rejects a recent call for a
“community caretaking warrant,” and argues that the U.S. Supreme
Court must roll back the expansion of the community caretaking
exception that allows warrantless searches of homes. In Part II, this
Comment discusses the background of the community caretaking
exception. It also briefly explains Fourth Amendment rights and
discusses the development of relevant exceptions to the warrant
requirement. In addition, Part II covers the development and expansion
of the community caretaking exception and lays out in detail the current
state of the law vis-à-vis the exception. Part III makes the case that it is
both unnecessary and unwise to expand the community caretaking
exception to cover the warrantless entry of homes. This analysis begins
in Part III.A with a discussion of how the emergency doctrine eliminates
the need for the community caretaking exception in cases of true
emergency. Part III.B continues with an explanation of how less-thanemergency conditions are not sufficient to overcome the Fourth
Amendment protections that up to now have been guaranteed to people
in their homes. Part III.C rejects a proposal to use “community
caretaking warrants” as a solution to the problem of community
30
caretaking expansion. Part III.D concludes the analysis by calling for a
rollback of the expansion of the community caretaking exception and
suggests how this rollback should occur in light of the recent U.S.
Supreme Court decisions that return property rights to the arena of
Fourth Amendment protection jurisprudence. Part IV makes a final
plea to the U.S. Supreme Court to restore the Fourth Amendment
guarantees that once protected our hearths and homes.

34306-mqt_97-1 Sheet No. 69 Side A

01/13/2014 11:22:05

HELDING 10 (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

12/3/2013 1:58 PM

THE COMMUNITY CARETAKING EXCEPTION

129

32

deemed “unreasonable.”
Warrantless, unconsented searches of a
home are per se unreasonable—unless the search falls within one of the
33
recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement. However, before
considering when a search is “unreasonable,” and thus prohibited, one
must first look at what is meant by a “search.”
34
35
When police are simply observing, they are not searching.
Something more is required in order for their actions to constitute a
36
search.
Prior to the mid-twentieth century, Fourth Amendment
protections were rooted in and aimed toward the protection of rights in
37
property. In the past, like today, when the police physically entered a
38
home without consent, such an entry was a search. The material nature
of the thing being searched and whether such thing was trespassed upon
39
were keys to the analysis. For example, in Olmstead v. United States,
the Supreme Court upheld warrantless wiretaps of phone wires outside
40
the home. Because there was no “actual physical invasion of [the]

01/13/2014 11:22:05
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allow warrantless entry into homes. Accordingly, the remainder of the discussion will focus
on searches, particularly as they apply to homes.
32. This concept is clear from the language of the amendment itself, which protects
against “unreasonable searches.” Id. Some searches, therefore, are impliedly reasonable and
thus allowed under the amendment.
33. 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 6.1(b) (5th ed. 2012) (“[I]t [is] ‘a
“basic principle of Fourth Amendment law” that searches and seizures inside a home without
a warrant are presumptively unreasonable.’” (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586
(1980))).
34. For purposes of this Comment, “police,” when not mentioned in the facts of a
particular case, refers to law enforcement or law enforcement officers in general.
35. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 953 (2012) (“[M]ere visual observation does
not constitute a search.”).
36. See id. at 950 (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)).
37. The Fourth Amendment’s focus on protecting property rights is clear from the text
of the amendment itself, which guarantees people the right “to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects,” and requires that warrants must “particularly describ[e] the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” U.S. CONST. amend. IV (emphasis
added). As the Court noted in Jones, this qualifying language “would have been superfluous”
if there was not a “close connection” between the amendment and property. Jones, 132 S. Ct.
at 949. Moreover, in Jones, the Court stated that its “Fourth Amendment jurisprudence was
tied to common-law trespass, at least until the latter half of the 20th century.” Id.
38. 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 2.3(b) (5th ed. 2012) (“It is beyond
question, therefore, that an unconsented police entry . . . into a residential unit . . . constitutes
a search . . . .”).
39. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949 (“[O]ur Fourth Amendment jurisprudence was tied to
common-law trespass, at least until the latter half of the 20th century.”); Olmstead v. United
States, 277 U.S. 438, 464 (1928) (“The Amendment itself shows that the search is to be of
material things—the person, the house, his papers or his effects.”).
40. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 464. Perhaps the Court had trouble grappling with the
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41

house,” and telephone conversations are not tangible things, the Court
42
reasoned that the wiretaps were not searches.
This focus on the
physical nature of the place or thing being searched shifted drastically
43
with Katz v. United States.
In Katz, the FBI attached a listening device to a phone booth in Los
44
Angeles. Charles Katz used that phone booth to violate federal law by
45
placing wagers to others in Miami and Boston. The listening device
allowed FBI agents to hear Katz’s side of the conversations without
46
In overturning Katz’s
them physically entering the phone booth.
conviction, the Court noted that “the Fourth Amendment protects
people—and not simply ‘areas,’” and held that the Amendment’s reach
“cannot turn upon the presence or absence of a physical intrusion into
47
any given enclosure.”
After Katz, a search was defined as a
government intrusion on an area where a person has a subjective
“expectation of privacy” that “society is prepared to recognize as
48
‘reasonable.’”
Under the “reasonable expectation” standard, the level of protection
provided by the Fourth Amendment varies with individual privacy
49
expectations. For example, in New York v. Class, the “less substantial”

01/13/2014 11:22:05
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enormity of how to apply the amendment to the relatively new technology of the telephone,
which was invented only fifty years before Olmstead was decided. Id. at 465 (“The language
of the Amendment [cannot] be extended and expanded to include telephone wires reaching
to the whole world from the defendant’s house or office.”). The Court also mentions both the
telegraph, which was still in use at the time, and telephone messages in its analysis. Id. at 464.
41. Id. at 466.
42. Id. at 464.
43. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (“We conclude that the
underpinnings of Olmstead and Goldman have been so eroded by our subsequent decisions
that the ‘trespass’ doctrine there enunciated can no longer be regarded as controlling.”). The
seeds of this shift were sown in Justice Brandeis’ dissent to the Olmstead decision. Olmstead,
277 U.S. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“[E]very unjustifiable intrusion by the Government
upon the privacy of the individual, whatever the means employed, must be deemed a
violation of the Fourth Amendment.”).
44. Katz, 389 U.S. at 348.
45. Id.; Katz v. United States, 369 F.2d 130, 130–32 (9th Cir. 1966), rev’d, 389 U.S. 347
(1967).
46. Katz, 389 U.S. at 348–49.
47. Id. at 353.
48. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). Justice Harlan explained how this new standard
could protect some but not all “objects, activities, or statements” that take place in a home.
Id. (“Thus a man’s home is, for most purposes, a place where he expects privacy, but objects,
activities, or statements that he exposes to the ‘plain view’ of outsiders are not ‘protected’
because no intention to keep them to himself has been exhibited.”).
49. See LAFAVE, supra note 38, § 2.1(b).
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expectation of privacy in an automobile allowed a police officer to reach
50
inside Benigno Class’s auto to move papers that obscured its VIN tag.
However, individual privacy expectations reach their zenith in the
home, which is “accorded the full range of Fourth Amendment
51
protections.” In United States v. United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Michigan, the U.S. Supreme Court again made this
point while bridging the gap between the “physical trespass” and
“reasonable expectation” standards when it observed that “[t]hough
physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of
the Fourth Amendment is directed, its broader spirit now shields private
52
speech from unreasonable surveillance.”
The reasonable expectation standard dominated Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence until two recent Supreme Court decisions re53
emphasized the property roots of the Fourth Amendment. In United
States v. Jones, FBI agents attached a GPS monitoring device to Antoine
Jones’s Jeep Grand Cherokee and tracked his movements over a
54
The majority in Jones ignored the
twenty-eight-day period.
government’s argument that Jones did not have a “reasonable
expectation of privacy” in the underbody of his Jeep and held that
attaching the GPS device was a physical intrusion and, thus, a search
55
In noting that “the Katz
that violated the Fourth Amendment.

01/13/2014 11:22:05
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50. New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 108, 111–12 (1986) (“A citizen does not surrender
all the protections of the Fourth Amendment by entering an automobile.”); Arizona v. Gant,
556 U.S. 332, 345 (2009). “[A] motorist’s privacy interest in his vehicle is less substantial than
in his home,” Gant, 556 U.S. at 345 (citing Class, 475 U.S. at 112–13), however, the “interest
[in his vehicle] is nevertheless important and deserving of constitutional protection.” Id.
(citing Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 117 (1998)).
51. Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 211 (1966).
52. United States v. U.S. Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972).
53. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012); LAFAVE, supra note 38,
§ 2.1(e) (“While the Supreme Court’s decision in Katz v. United States seemed to sound the
death knell for the pre-Katz ‘trespass’ approach to determining the scope of the Fourth
Amendment’s coverage, over fifty years later, in United States v. Jones, the trespass doctrine
re-emerged as an alternate theory to the Katz expectation-of-privacy approach.”(footnotes
omitted)); see also Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1417–18 (2013) (holding that the
government’s use of forensic narcotic dogs in the curtilage of a home was a physical intrusion
and thus a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment).
54. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 948.
55. Id. at 949–50 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J.,
concurring)) (“The Government contends that . . . Jones had no ‘reasonable expectation of
privacy’ in the area of the Jeep accessed by Government agents . . . . But we need not address
the Government’s contentions, because Jones’s Fourth Amendment rights do not rise or fall
with the Katz formulation.”).
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reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test has been added to, not substituted
for, the common-law trespassory test,” the Court made it clear that
while the trespassory test may have been down for a while, it was not
56
out.
In Florida v. Jardines, the Supreme Court built on Jones and further
revived the trespassory test by applying it in a case involving the search
57
of a home.
In Jardines, Miami-Dade detectives obtained a search
warrant for Joelis Jardines’s home only after a drug-sniffing dog that
58
they brought onto his front porch detected the odor of marijuana.
Noting that “[o]ne virtue of the Fourth Amendment’s property-rights
baseline is that it keeps easy cases easy,” the Court held that using drugsniffing police dogs on the curtilage of the home was a physical intrusion
59
and thus a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
A rule like the trespassory test makes for more clear-cut decisions,
60
such as the decisions in the Olmstead, Jones, and Jardines cases.
However, Jones and Jardines are recent decisions, and the U.S. Supreme
Court has “long held that the ‘touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is
61
In general,
reasonableness’”—which is a standard and not a rule.
62
standards allow for less certain and more varied outcomes than rules.

01/13/2014 11:22:05
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56. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 952. The Court further clarifies this notion in a footnote: “A
trespass on ‘houses’ or ‘effects,’ or a Katz invasion of privacy, is not alone a search unless it is
done to obtain information; and the obtaining of information is not alone a search unless it is
achieved by such a trespass or invasion of privacy.” Id. at 951 n.5.
57. Jardines, 133 S.Ct. at 1417–18 (holding that the government’s use of a drug-sniffing
dog in the curtilage of a home was a physical intrusion and thus a search within the meaning
of the Fourth Amendment).
58. Id. at 1413.
59. Id. at 1417–18.
60. See supra notes 40, 53, 57 and accompanying text.
61. Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409 (2013); United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945
(2012); Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996) (quoting Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248,
250 (1991)).
62. See Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175,
1187 (1989) (encouraging appellate judges to avoid standards in favor of rules where
possible); Morgan Cloud, Searching Through History; Searching for History, 63 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1707, 1723 (1996) (book review) (“[J]udges applying the increasingly malleable
standard of reasonableness can adopt whatever policies they prefer.”). Professor Sullivan
explains that legal standards allow for more flexibility: “A legal directive is ‘rule’-like when it
binds a decisionmaker to respond in a determinate way to the presence of delimited
triggering facts,” whereas “[a] legal directive is ‘standard’-like when it tends to collapse
decisionmaking back into the direct application of the background principle or policy to a fact
situation.” Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22,
58 (1992). Professor Sullivan goes on to note that standards “giv[e] the decisionmaker more
discretion than do rules.” Id. at 58–59.
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63

This characteristic is especially evident in the reasonableness standard,
64
which is often referred to as a “malleable standard.” Unfortunately,
this malleability can work both for and against those who seek the
65
protection guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment.
In Katz, reasonableness was used to expand people’s rights under
the Fourth Amendment, whereas the trespassory test would have
66
limited them. Like metal, which is considered malleable if it can be
“hammered, pounded, or pressed into various shapes without
67
breaking,” the reasonable expectation of privacy standard has been
hammered, pounded, and pressed so much that the government felt
confident arguing in Jones that the standard should now allow the very

63. See Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 357 (1931) (“There is no
formula for the determination of reasonableness. Each case is to be decided on its own facts
and circumstances.”).
64. Legal scholars and jurists alike agree that reasonableness is a malleable standard:
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Reasonableness, then, is not a definite, arithmetic, objective quality that is
independent of aims and values. It is a concept that is considerably more subtle,
complex, malleable, and mysterious than the simplistic model of human
decisionmaking relied upon by those who accept at face value the “reasonableness”
or “rationality” of conduct that not only expresses controversial moral and political
judgments but that also expresses deep-seated, perhaps unconscious, affections,
fears, and aversions.
RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW 144–45 (1997) (emphasis added).
Quoting Circuit Judge Ferguson, Justice Marshall once referred to reasonable suspicion as
having a “chameleon-like way of adapting to any particular set of observations.” United
States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 13 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v.
Sokolow, 831 F.2d 1413, 1418 (9th Cir. 1987)); see also Morgan Cloud, Pragmatism,
Positivism, and Principles in Fourth Amendment Theory, 41 UCLA L. REV. 199, 265 (1993)
(“The decline of rules in fourth amendment theory is exemplified by a number of recent cases
in which the Court determines the constitutionality of government conduct by resorting to a
malleable ‘objective’ test of reasonableness viewed from the police officer’s perspective.”);
Eugene D. Bryant, Note, Snoop Dogs: An Analysis of Narcotics Canine Sniffs of Storage
Units Under the Fourth Amendment, 40 GA. L. REV. 1209, 1243 (2006) (“While the
reasonableness test is malleable and subject to various interpretations by judges in different
jurisdictions, the courts are not alien to discretionary tests. The Supreme Court has inquired
into reasonableness since the [Terry v. Ohio] decision in 1968.”); Garth Thomas, Note,
Random Suspicionless Drug Testing: Are Students No Longer Afforded Fourth Amendment
Protections?, 46 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 821, 848–49 (2002–2003) (“[T]he Court’s deviation from
the warrant requirement to the ‘reasonableness’ approach to Fourth Amendment
interpretation has provided school districts with a malleable solution devoid of individualized
suspicion.”).
65. See supra note 62.
66. See supra notes 43–48 and accompanying text.
67. WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD COLLEGE DICTIONARY 870 (Michael Agnes & David B.
Guralnik eds., 4th ed. 2002).
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68

intrusion it first forbade in Katz.
Are the rights evaluated and
protected by the reasonableness standard malleable as well? Jones
69
demonstrated that Fourth Amendment rights have not been broken.
However, those rights have proven to be as malleable as the
70
reasonableness standard. The various shapes into which they have
been beaten make up the exceptions to the warrant requirement, some
of which this Comment will now explore.
B. Exceptions to the Warrant Requirement
Over time, the courts have developed various exceptions to the
71
This Comment focuses on the community
warrant requirement.
caretaking exception and its expansion to allow warrantless home
searches. It examines only those exceptions that relate to the
community
caretaking
exception:
the
emergency
doctrine,
administrative warrants, and, of course, community caretaking itself.
1. The Emergency Doctrine Exception
At 3 a.m. on July 23, 2000, Brigham City police officers, responding
to a loud noise complaint, observed a melee through the windows of the
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68. See supra note 55. In Katz, a device was placed on the exterior of a phone booth to
listen to conversations. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 348 (1967). In Jones, a device
was placed on the exterior of a vehicle to track its movements. United States v. Jones, 132 S.
Ct. 945, 948 (2012). In Katz, the reasonableness standard was used to protect against such an
intrusion, whereas in Jones, the government urged that same standard be used to allow such
an intrusion. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 950; Katz, 389 U.S. at 353. A mere forty-five years after
Katz, a situation very similar to the one that gave rise to the new standard and its
accompanying protections could have been left outside those very protections by the standard
that created them. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 950–51. “Like the Ouroboros swallowing its tail,
[the reasonableness standard] has ingested its own original justification.” Youngblood v.
West Virginia, 547 U.S. 867, 874 (2006) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
69. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 950–51.
70. See Cloud, supra note 64, at 265.
71. See, e.g., Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 181 (1990) (finding an exception where
“voluntary consent has been obtained, either from the individual whose property is searched,
or from a third party who possesses common authority over the premises” (citations
omitted)); Barnes v. State, 25 Wis. 2d 116, 121, 130 N.W.2d 264, 267 (1964) (finding an
exception where “the person freely and intelligently gives his unequivocal and specific
consent to the search, uncontaminated by any duress or coercion, actual or implied”); State v.
Stewart, 2011 WI App 152, ¶ 24, 337 Wis. 2d 618, 807 N.W.2d 15, review denied, 2012 WI 34,
339 Wis. 2d 737, 810 N.W.2d 223 (2012) (“One such exception applies when, incident to a
lawful arrest, police search a vehicle when ‘it is “reasonable to believe evidence relevant to
the crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle.”’” (quoting Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332,
343 (2009))).

34306-mqt_97-1 Sheet No. 72 Side A

01/13/2014 11:22:05

HELDING 10 (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

12/3/2013 1:58 PM

THE COMMUNITY CARETAKING EXCEPTION

135

72

home, which they subsequently entered.
The melee involved four
73
adults, all of whom were intoxicated at the time, and a juvenile. The
adults were charged with several minor offenses stemming from these
74
events. At trial, the defendants argued that the officers’ warrantless
entry into the home violated the Fourth Amendment and moved to
75
suppress the evidence gained by the entry. In an “odd flyspeck of a
76
case,” the suppression motion made it to the U.S. Supreme Court,
77
which succinctly defined—and reiterated—the emergency doctrine.
The Court held that “law enforcement officers [are permitted to] enter a
home without a warrant to render emergency assistance to an injured
78
occupant or to protect an occupant from imminent injury.” Six years
later, in Ryburn v. Huff, the U.S. Supreme Court clarified that its recent
cases on the emergency doctrine mean “the Fourth Amendment permits
an officer to enter a residence if the officer has a reasonable basis for
79
concluding that there is an imminent threat of violence.”
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72. Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 400–01 (2006).
73. Id. at 401.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 407 (Stevens, J., concurring).
77. Id. at 403–04 (majority opinion). This is not to be confused with the “emergency
doctrine” (sometimes referred to as the “sudden emergency doctrine”) from the common law
of torts, which applies in cases of negligence. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 296
(1965) (“In determining whether conduct is negligent toward another, the fact that the actor
is confronted with a sudden emergency which requires rapid decision is a factor in
determining the reasonable character of his choice of action.”). Both doctrines are similar in
that they take emergency circumstances into account when evaluating, after the fact, the
reasonableness of a person’s actions in a given situation.
78. Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 403. The Supreme Court first recognized this exception in
1978. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392 (1978) (“We do not question the right of the
police to respond to emergency situations.”).
79. Ryburn v. Huff, 132 S. Ct. 987, 990 (2012) (per curiam). This case is of interest in
light of the recent national focus on school shootings in the wake of the Newtown,
Connecticut massacre. See, e.g., Steve Vogel et al., Killer’s Motive Still a Mystery, WASH.
POST, Dec. 16, 2012, at A1. In Ryburn, officers were responding to a home to investigate a
rumored threat from a student to “shoot up” his school. Ryburn, 132 S. Ct. at 988. When the
police arrived at the home to inquire about the threat, they encountered strange behavior
from the student’s mother, which prompted them to enter the home. Id. at 988–89. The
officers did not conduct a search of the home or the occupants, but their actions were
subsequently challenged in a § 1983 action. Ryburn, 132 S. Ct. at 988–89; see also 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (2006). The Court issued a forceful per curiam opinion in which they reversed the
Ninth Circuit and entered a judgment in favor of the officers. Ryburn, 132 S. Ct. at 988, 990–
92 (“No decision of this Court has found a Fourth Amendment violation on facts even
roughly comparable to those present in this case. On the contrary, some of our opinions may
be read as pointing in the opposition direction.”).
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Also known as the “emergency aid” exception, the emergency
80
doctrine is often confused with the “exigent circumstances” exception.
The emergency aid exception focuses on the protection of people,
whereas the exigent circumstances exception focuses on the protection
81
This distinction is important because the original
of evidence.
formulation of the community caretaking exception involves police
82
actions totally divorced from investigation. In the early years of its
development, the emergency aid exception took a similar approach:
Law enforcement officers may enter private premises without
either an arrest or a search warrant to preserve life or property,
to render first aid and assistance, or to conduct a general inquiry
into an unsolved crime, provided they have reasonable grounds
to believe that there is an urgent need for such assistance and
protective action, or to promptly launch a criminal investigation
involving a substantial threat of imminent danger to either life,
health, or property, and provided, further, that they do not enter
83
with an accompanying intent to either arrest or search.
84

This approach is reflected in the three-part Mitchell test, which was
first articulated by the New York Court of Appeals:
(1) The police must have reasonable grounds to believe that
there is an emergency at hand and an immediate need for their
assistance for the protection of life or property.
(2) The search must not be primarily motivated by intent to
arrest and seize evidence.
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80. See State v. Jones, 947 P.2d 1030, 1037 (Kan. Ct. App. 1997) (“[T]he exigent
circumstances exception is distinct from the emergency exception, and the two are often
confused . . . .”); MacDonald v. Town of Eastham, No. 12-12061-RGS, 2013 WL 2303760, at
*5 (D. Mass. May 24, 2013) (noting a “widely-shared confusion between and among the
distinct doctrines of community caretaking, emergency aid, and exigent circumstances”);
State v. Pinkard, 2010 WI 81, ¶ 26 n.8, 327 Wis. 2d 346, 785 N.W.2d 592, cert. denied, 131 S.
Ct. 1001 (2011); Isaac J. Colunga, When the Supreme Court Departs from Its Traditional
Function, 45 VAL. U. L. REV. 47, 53 (2010) (“[I]n applying the emergency aid exception, some
courts consider it a variation of the exigent circumstances exception . . . .”).
81. See Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51 (1970) (“[A] search warrant [is]
unnecessary where there is probable cause to search an automobile stopped on the highway;
the car is movable, the occupants are alerted, and the car’s contents may never be found again
if a warrant must be obtained. Hence an immediate search is constitutionally permissible.”).
82. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
83. Edward G. Mascolo, The Emergency Doctrine Exception to the Warrant Requirement
Under the Fourth Amendment, 22 BUFF. L. REV. 419, 426 (1973) (emphasis added).
84. People v. Mitchell, 347 N.E.2d 607, 609 (N.Y. 1976), abrogated by Brigham City v.
Stuart, 547 U.S. 398 (2006).
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(3) There must be some reasonable basis, approximating
probable cause, to associate the emergency with the area or place
85
to be searched.
The second prong ensures that the “protection of human life or property
in imminent danger must be the motivation for the search rather than the
desire to apprehend a suspect or gather evidence for use in a criminal
86
proceeding.”
Some courts have adopted this test to evaluate law
87
enforcement’s use of the emergency aid exception but most
88
jurisdictions have not. Although state courts are free to maintain the
motive requirement articulated in the Mitchell test, the U.S. Supreme
Court eliminated that option for federal courts in the Brigham City v.
89
Stuart decision in 2006. Now, “[a]n action is ‘reasonable’ under the
Fourth Amendment, regardless of the individual officer’s state of mind,
90
‘as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify [the] action.’”
Simply stated, the emergency aid exception says that, police do not
need a warrant to enter a home to provide help to the injured or prevent
further injury in an emergency, even if the police are also there to
investigate crime or detain suspects, as long as there is an objectively
91
For example, in
reasonable basis for the actions taken by police.
Brigham City, the police did not need a warrant to enter the home to
stop people from being injured in a fight, even if they were also planning
92
on arresting some of those participating in the fight.
2. Administrative Warrants
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85. Mitchell, 347 N.E.2d at 609.
86. Id. at 610 (emphasis added).
87. LAFAVE, supra note 33, § 6.6(a) n.29 (“Several other courts follow this three-point
test.”).
88. John F. Decker, Emergency Circumstances, Police Responses, and Fourth
Amendment Restrictions, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 433, 533 (1999) (“In fact, [the
Mitchell test] has been in existence for more than twenty years, but it has not been utilized in
a majority of jurisdictions.”).
89. See Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 402–04 (noting that, when discussing the subjective
motivation requirement, “[o]ur cases have repeatedly rejected this approach”).
90. Id. at 404 (alteration in original) (first emphasis added) (quoting Scott v. United
States, 436 U.S. 128, 138 (1978)).
91. Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 402–05.
92. Id. at 405.
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Amendment, “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause.” In
1967, the U.S. Supreme Court considered the probable cause element of
the warrant requirement as it applied to administrative rather than
94
criminal law. In Camara, the appellant, Roland Camara, challenged
the constitutionality of a San Francisco housing ordinance that
authorized warrantless health and safety inspections of residential
properties without probable cause to believe the housing code was being
95
violated.
The Court held that these inspections “are significant
intrusions upon the interests protected by the Fourth Amendment,” and
96
that they could not be conducted without a warrant. The Court then
examined “whether some other accommodation between public need
97
and individual rights is essential” in these types of cases.
The Court looked at what would constitute probable cause within
98
the context of a code inspection.
Before 1967, the Fourth
Amendment’s “reasonableness clause had been used to excuse the
99
absence of a warrant, but not the lack of probable cause.”
After
stating “reasonableness is still the ultimate standard,” the Court held
that “[i]f a valid public interest justifies the intrusion contemplated, then
100
there is probable cause to issue a suitably restricted search warrant.”
Now, instead of probable cause making a search reasonable,
101
reasonableness makes for probable cause.
3. The Community Caretaking Exception
Community caretaking by itself is not an exception to the warrant
requirement; rather, it is a description of what police do when they are
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93. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (emphasis added).
94. Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 530 (1967) (“We may agree that a routine
inspection of the physical condition of private property is a less hostile intrusion than the
typical policeman’s search for the fruits and instrumentalities of crime.”).
95. Id. at 525–27; Camara v. Mun. Court, 46 Cal. Rptr. 585 (Cal. Ct. App. 1965).
96. Camara, 387 U.S. at 534.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 535 (“In determining whether a particular inspection is reasonable—and thus
in determining whether there is probable cause to issue a warrant for that inspection—the
need for the inspection must be weighed in terms of these reasonable goals of code
enforcement.”).
99. Robert Berkley Harper, Has the Replacement of “Probable Cause” with “Reasonable
Suspicion” Resulted in the Creation of the Best of All Possible Worlds?, 22 AKRON L. REV. 13,
20 (1988).
100. Camara, 387 U.S. at 539.
101. See Harper, supra note 99, at 21.
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102

not investigating crime.
Police regularly perform community
caretaking activities to help people in danger, to preserve property, or to
103
“create and maintain a feeling of security in the community.” Police
also engage in community caretaking when they respond to noise
complaints, mediate non-criminal disputes, assist the “ill or injured,”
“[take] lost property into their possession,” remove abandoned
property, or are called on to act as surrogates for a variety of society’s
104
A police officer’s community caretaking activity
usual caregivers.
becomes an exception to the warrant requirement if the officer has to
105
perform a search in order to complete the caretaking activity.
The U.S. Supreme Court first recognized this exception in Cady v.
106
Dombrowski.
The Court held that searches made while performing
community caretaking functions do not require warrants and are subject
107
only to the reasonableness standard. At the time, the Court focused
on the “constitutional difference between houses and cars” when it
ruled that automobile searches are a “partial exception” to the warrant
108
requirement. As initially conceived by the Court, the motives of the
police engaged in community caretaking are supposed to be “totally
divorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence
109
relating to the violation of a criminal statute.” Since Cady, courts have
expanded the exception to allow warrantless searches of homes despite
110
mixed motives on the part of law enforcement.
C. Community Caretaking Expands
In the years since the inception of the community caretaking
111
exception, which was initially limited to searches of automobiles, both
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102. See Livingston, supra note 14, at 271–72.
103. Id. at 272 (quoting STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 1-2.2 (1980)).
104. Livingston, supra note 14, at 272.
105. For example, an officer checking on a sleeping motorist at the side of the road may
discover a gun at the motorist’s feet. People v. Murray, 560 N.E.2d 309, 310 (Ill. 1990); see
also infra Part II.C.
106. See supra notes 1–6, 11–12 and accompanying text.
107. Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 447–48 (1973).
108. Id. at 439 (“Although vehicles are ‘effects’ within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment, ‘for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment there is a constitutional difference
between houses and cars.’” (quoting Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 52 (1970))).
109. Cady, 413 U.S. at 441.
110. See, e.g., State v. Pinkard, 2010 WI 81, ¶¶ 16–27, 327 Wis. 2d 346, 785 N.W.2d 592,
cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1001 (2011).
111. Cady, 413 U.S. at 441–43, 447–48.
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federal circuit and state supreme courts have expanded the community
112
caretaking exception to allow the warrantless searches of homes. At
least one court has also expanded the motives allowed by police for the
community caretaking searches and now allows for mixed motives or
113
The discussion that follows
pretextual community caretaking.
examines, in chronological order, the cases that led the various courts to
expand the exception. This Comment will first look at the federal
courts.
1. Federal Circuits
Three federal circuits, the Sixth Circuit in 1996, the Fourth Circuit in
2001, and the Eighth Circuit in 2006, have expanded the community
caretaking exception.
a. Sixth Circuit
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112. See, e.g., United States v. Rohrig, 98 F.3d 1506, 1509 (6th Cir. 1996); State v.
Alexander, 721 A.2d 275, 286–87 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1998).
113. See infra Part II.C.2.e; infra notes 264–68 and accompanying text.
114. See Rohrig, 98 F.3d at 1509.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 1510.
118. Id. at 1523.
119. Id. at 1524.
120. Id. at 1522.
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In the pre-dawn hours of May 22, 1994, two Canton, Ohio, police
officers were investigating a loud noise complaint at the home of
114
Donald Rohrig. The officers entered the home through an unlocked
door after receiving no answer when they knocked on the door and
115
During their efforts to locate
tapped on all the first floor windows.
Rohrig, they discovered a sophisticated marijuana grow operation in the
116
basement. Rohrig, facing federal drug charges, moved to suppress the
evidence on the basis that the officers violated his Fourth Amendment
117
rights when they entered his home without a warrant. When the Sixth
Circuit heard his appeal, the court held that the warrantless entry of a
118
residence was justified under the community caretaking exception.
The court was “simply unable to identify any unreasonable conduct on
119
the part of the . . . officers,” and concluded that the government’s
interest in quieting the loud music was sufficient to justify the
120
warrantless entry of Rohrig’s home.
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In a more recent case, the Sixth Circuit reined in the expansion
somewhat by maintaining Cady’s distinction between law enforcement
and community caretaking, and noting: “The community caretaking
function of the police cannot apply where . . . there is significant
121
suspicion of criminal activity.”
b. Fourth Circuit
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121. United States v. Williams, 354 F.3d 497, 507–08 (6th Cir. 2003) (expressing concern
over the purity of DEA agents’ motives for investigating a water leak in an apartment where
sparse furniture, smells, and small leaves had been reported).
122. Phillips v. Peddle, 7 F. App’x 175, 176–77 (4th Cir. 2001) (“Although some of the
facts that Detective Russell presented were untrue, this was the scene that Detective Russell
presented to Officer Peddle.”).
123. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).
124. Phillips, 7 F. App’x at 177.
125. Id. at 177–78, 180.
126. Id. at 179–80.
127. See id. at 178–80 (citing United States v. Rohrig, 98 F.3d 1506, 1509 (6th Cir. 1996);
Wood v. Commonwealth (Wood II), 497 S.E.2d 484, 487 (Va. Ct. App. 1998) (en banc);
Commonwealth v. Waters, 456 S.E.2d 527, 529–30 (Va. Ct. App. 1995)).
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In 1999, Officer Michael Peddle, based partially on lies told to him
by a detective who had been attempting to serve Britt Phillips with a
subpoena, entered Britt Phillip’s home through an open front door to
122
123
check on his welfare. Phillips brought a § 1983 action against Peddle
alleging that Peddle violated his Fourth Amendment rights when Peddle
124
entered his home.
Affirming the district court’s grant of summary
judgment against Phillips, the Fourth Circuit found that “Peddle did not
violate any clearly established law when he entered the home” because
125
he “was acting under the aegis of the community caretaker doctrine.”
The court reasoned that Peddle’s warrantless home entry was allowable
because neither the U.S. Supreme Court nor the Virginia Supreme
Court have “established law refuting the applicability of the community
126
caretaker doctrine to an entry into a residence.” The Fourth Circuit,
relying heavily on precedent from the Sixth Circuit and the Virginia
Court of Appeals, preserved, as those courts did, the totally divorced
127
standard from Cady.
In 2009, the Fourth Circuit clarified its community caretaking
jurisprudence in Hunsberger v. Wood when it explained that community
caretaking “is in no sense an open-ended grant of discretion that will
justify a warrantless search whenever an officer can point to some
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128

interest unrelated to the detection of crime.”
In Hunsberger, police
entered a home without a warrant to search for a missing minor and
suspected vandals because neighbors mistakenly thought the
129
130
In a subsequent § 1983 action, the
homeowners were on vacation.
court held that the community caretaking exception did not apply to the
search because the police were not following “a standard policy that
131
Because community
could be classified as community caretaking.”
caretaking focuses on functions more than circumstances, the court
wanted to see a programmatic basis for an officer’s actions, “such as the
132
In the
policy of locating weapons in towed cars in Dombrowski.”
Fourth Circuit, although community caretaking functions allow police
into homes without a warrant, those functions must be policy driven and
133
separate from crime detection and investigation.
c. Eighth Circuit
In U.S. v. Quezada, the Eighth Circuit held that a sheriff’s deputy
attempting to serve papers was acting as a community caretaker when
he entered Tiffany Giannone’s apartment without a warrant and
discovered Giannone’s houseguest on the floor sleeping on top of a
134
shotgun. The deputy had knocked on the door, which, because it was
135
unlatched, opened a bit. Through the opening, the deputy could see a
136
light and hear a television. He announced his presence and received
137
He entered the apartment with his weapon drawn,
no answer.
whereupon he saw a pair of legs on the floor, protruding from the
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128. Hunsberger v. Wood, 570 F.3d 546, 554 (4th Cir. 2009). The court also
distinguished community caretaking from the emergency aid doctrine: “The community
caretaking doctrine requires a court to look at the function performed by a police officer,
while the emergency exception requires an analysis of the circumstances to determine
whether an emergency requiring immediate action existed. Thus, as the district court noted,
the doctrines have different ‘intellectual underpinning[s].’” Id. (alteration in original)
(quoting Hunsberger v. Wood, 564 F. Supp. 2d 559, 567 (W.D. Va. 2008), rev’d, 570 F.3d 546
(4th Cir. 2009)).
129. Hunsberger, 570 F.3d at 549–51.
130. Id. at 552; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).
131. Hunsberger, 570 F.3d at 554.
132. Id.
133. See id.
134. United States v. Quezada, 448 F.3d 1005, 1006 (8th Cir. 2006).
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
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138

bedroom. The legs belonged to the defendant, Christopher Quezada,
who was arrested for being a felon in possession of a firearm—the
139
shotgun upon which he was sleeping. In allowing the search, the court
held “[a] police officer may enter a residence without a warrant as a
community caretaker where the officer has a reasonable belief that an
140
The court noted
emergency exists requiring his or her attention.”
concerns about officers using their caretaking responsibilities as pretext
to gain entry to a home but found those concerns could be addressed by
the emergency nature of this exception, although it did not decide the
141
issue.
2. State Courts
An increasing number of state courts, some following the lead of the
federal circuits, and others following the lead of other states before
them, have expanded the community caretaking exception to allow for
the warrantless entry of homes.
a. Maryland
On Thanksgiving Day 1997, a Calvert County sheriff’s deputy
responded to an anonymous call about an open basement door at Carol
142
and James Alexander’s home.
Although there were “no signs of a
forcible entry” and the family dog started barking only after the deputy
knocked on the door, the deputy and a backup entered the basement
143
and found it in “disarray.” While searching the rest of the home for
“possible intruders,” the deputies discovered some marijuana—in what
144
they claimed was in plain view —on a shelf in a walk-in closet of the
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138. Id.
139. Id. at 1006–07.
140. Id. at 1007 (citing Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392–93 (1978)).
141. Quezada, 448 F.3d at 1007–08 (“But we do not have to decide the legal relevance, if
any, that the subjective intent of the officer in the present case might have because the district
court found on an ample record that Deputy Ruth entered the apartment to investigate a
possible emergency situation.”).
142. State v. Alexander, 721 A.2d 275, 276–77 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1998).
143. Id. at 278.
144. Id. The court did not question that the marijuana was in plain view. Id. at 287 (“It
was only when looking into a walk-in closet in the master bedroom, a place where an intruder
could well have been hiding, that the officers saw marijuana on a shelf in plain view.”). The
court further asserts that “[t]here was saliently missing from the circumstances of this case
any possibility that the two officers were engaging in any sort of a subterfuge.” Id. (emphasis
added). However, an argument can be made that the evidence was not truly in plain sight if
officers could only have discovered the evidence after making their way from the basement to
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master bedroom. In deciding the case, the Maryland Court of Special
Appeals first established that reasonableness, not probable cause, was
146
the standard by which to judge such entries.
In so doing, the court
expanded community caretaking to allow for warrantless home entries
and subsequently found that “[w]hat the officers did in this case was the
quintessence of the reasonable performance of their community
147
caretaking function.”
b. Virginia
In 1994, the Virginia Court of Appeals first recognized the
148
community caretaking exception from Cady.
A year later, in
Commonwealth v. Waters, the court clarified that the exception was not
149
limited to automobiles.
Although the defendant in Waters was
searched on the street, the door to warrantless home searches was
150
In 1997, the court walked through that door in Wood v.
opened.
Commonwealth (Wood I) when it applied “the community caretaker
doctrine to justify the warrantless entry into and investigative search of
151
While the court found that
the second floor of [Wood’s] home.”
“little, if any, distinction exists in Virginia law between the
circumstances governing the application of the community caretaker
doctrine and those governing the application of the ‘emergency’
exception,” it did treat the exceptions separately and thus does not limit
152
the application of community caretaking to emergency situations.
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the master bedroom and opening the closet door. See id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 284–85 (“When the police cross a threshold not in their criminal investigatory
capacity but as part of their community caretaking function, it is clear that the standard for
assessing the Fourth Amendment propriety of such conduct is whether they possessed a
reasonable basis for doing what they did.”).
147. Id. at 287.
148. Barrett v. Commonwealth, 447 S.E.2d 243, 245 (Va. Ct. App. 1994) (en banc)
(“Citing Cady v. Dombrowski, the Commonwealth argues that officers may conduct
investigative seizures in the routine execution of community caretaking functions, totally
divorced from the detection or investigation of crime, so long as those seizures are
reasonable. We agree.” (citations omitted)), rev’d on other grounds, 462 S.E.2d 109 (Va.
1995).
149. Commonwealth v. Waters, 456 S.E.2d 527, 530 (Va. Ct. App. 1995) (noting that “no
language in Barrett or Cady restricts an officer’s community caretaking actions to incidents
involving automobiles”).
150. Id. at 528–30.
151. See Wood v. Commonwealth (Wood I), 484 S.E.2d 627, 630 (Va. Ct. App. 1997),
rev’d, 497 S.E.2d 484 (Va. Ct. App. 1998) (en banc).
152. See Wood I, 484 S.E.2d at 630–31.
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Under the community caretaking exception, “[a]n officer may take
appropriate action . . . where the officer maintains a reasonable and
153
articulable suspicion . . . that such action is necessary.”
The court
reversed its decision a year later, but the majority did not explicitly hold
that the community caretaking doctrine could not apply to warrantless
154
home entry, merely that it did not apply given the facts of that case.
One thing that the court was absolutely clear on in the Wood II decision
155
was that it was maintaining the totally divorced standard from Cady.
c. California
On Christmas Day 1996, Richmond, California, police officers were
called to the home of Andre Ray because its door had been “open all
156
day,” and the home was “a shambles inside.” Although the door was
open only two feet and “there were no signs of forced entry,” the
officers entered the home, where they discovered a large quantity of
157
158
Citing, inter alia, State v. Alexander, the
cocaine and money.
Supreme Court of California affirmed the court of appeal and expanded
159
the community caretaking exception in California. However, the court
160
placed some limits on the expansion : (1) officers’ search of the home
must be “narrowly delimited by the known facts” that gave rise to the
161
and (2) trial courts must judge officers’ credibility and
entry,
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153. Id. at 631.
154. Wood II, 497 S.E.2d 484, 487 (Va. Ct. App. 1998) (en banc) (“We, therefore, hold
that the warrantless entry by the officers into the second floor of Wood’s residence was not
justified by any ‘community caretaker’ function. . . . Nothing in this record supports an
extension of its application to a warrantless intrusion into Wood’s upstairs bedroom under the
circumstances proved in this record.”). This was also enough to convince the Fourth Circuit,
which relied on this holding when it expanded the community caretaking exception. See
supra note 127 and accompanying text.
155. Wood II, 497 S.E.2d at 487 (“[O]n these facts, the officers’ intrusion into the room
on the second floor of the home was not totally divorced from investigating criminal activity
and acquiring evidence and, therefore, could not be considered a caretaking function.”); see
also Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441 (1973).
156. People v. Ray, 981 P.2d 928, 931 (Cal. 1999).
157. Id. at 931–32.
158. Id. at 935–36 (“For present purposes, State v. Alexander is particularly instructive.”
(citation omitted)).
159. Id. at 931 (holding that under the community caretaking exception, “officers acted
reasonably to protect the safety and security of persons and property when they briefly
entered defendant’s residence without a warrant”).
160. Id. at 937 (“In adopting a community caretaking exception, we emphasize two
aspects critical to maintaining the essential constitutional balance.”).
161. Id.
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motivations when evaluating the reasonableness of the entry.
With
the second limit, the court clearly preserves Cady’s totally divorced
163
standard.
d. South Dakota
On April 27, 2007, a Sioux Falls, South Dakota, police officer
responded to a call from the local gas utility concerning possible theft of
164
natural gas in a residential neighborhood.
When the officer
approached the home from which the utility suspected gas was being
stolen, he observed what he considered to be a “wide open, unsecured
house”: the front glass storm door was closed and unlocked, but the
165
He could detect a faint smell of
main door behind it was open.
ammonia, and a neighbor informed him that the occupant of the home
166
had been “caught at Kmart buying Sudafed.” After a backup officer
arrived, the two officers entered the home “to check to make sure
167
nobody was incapacitated inside.”
The officers found no one in the
home but did discover evidence that methamphetamine was being
168
The officers left the home, obtained and
manufactured there.
executed a search warrant, and arrested the homeowner, Brian
169
Deneui.
In Deneui, the Supreme Court of South Dakota noted,
“[H]omes cannot be arbitrarily isolated from the community caretaking
equation,” and held that the exception could justify the warrantless
170
search of a home. However, the court preserved the totally divorced
171
standard and distinguished the community caretaking exception from
the emergency doctrine, which it observed “implicate[s] . . . actual
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162. Id. at 938 (“[T]he trial courts play a vital gatekeeper role, judging not only the
credibility of the officers’ testimony but of their motivations.”).
163. Id. (“Any intention of engaging in crime-solving activities will defeat the
community caretaking exception even in cases of mixed motives.”); see also Cady v.
Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441 (1973).
164. State v. Deneui, 775 N.W.2d 221, 226–27 (S.D. 2009).
165. Id. at 227.
166. Id. Despite these clues, the court was convinced that officers “did not suspect a
methamphetamine lab until after [they were] inside the residence.” Id. at 231.
167. Id. at 227–28.
168. Id. at 228.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 239.
171. Id. (“[T]he police action must be apart from the detection, investigation, or
acquisition of criminal evidence; and the officer should be able to articulate specific facts that,
taken with rational inferences, reasonably warrant the intrusion.”).
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172

e. Wisconsin
173

In 2010, relying on some of the decisions above for justification,
Wisconsin expanded the community caretaking exception to allow for
174
The
the warrantless searching of homes in the Pinkard case.
Wisconsin Supreme Court adopted a three-step test for this exception:
[T]he circuit court must determine: (1) whether a search or
seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment has
occurred; (2) if so, whether the police were exercising a bona fide
community caretaker function; and (3) if so, whether the public
interest outweighs the intrusion upon the privacy of the
individual such that the community caretaker function was
175
reasonably exercised within the context of a home.

One might think that the second prong’s “bona fide” requirement
176
maintains the totally divorced standard, but it does not.
It simply
means “officers must be able to articulate an objectively reasonable
177
belief that entry into the home is necessary to prevent harm.”
Wisconsin law enforcement officers may have mixed motives for a
community caretaking search as long as the motive to protect and
178
The third prong is evaluated by
render assistance is “paramount.”
balancing public interest in the search against the “intrusion on the
179
citizen’s constitutional interest.” Although one of the factors balanced
180
was exigency, the court was careful not to confuse the emergency
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172. Deneui, 775 N.W.2d at 239 (emphasis added).
173. State v. Pinkard, 2010 WI 81, ¶ 20 n.6, 327 Wis. 2d 346, 785 N.W.2d 592 (relying on,
inter alia, United States v. Rohrig, 98 F.3d 1506 (6th Cir. 1996), People v. Ray, 981 P.2d 928
(Cal. 1999), and Commonwealth v. Waters, 456 S.E.2d 527 (Va. Ct. App. 1995) to support its
holding that community caretaking was not limited to automobiles), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct.
1001 (2011).
174. Pinkard, 2010 WI 81, ¶¶ 26–28.
175. Pinkard, 2010 WI 81, ¶ 29 (emphasis added) (citing State v. Kramer, 2009 WI 14,
¶ 21, 315 Wis. 2d 414, 759 N.W.2d 598).
176. See Pinkard, 2010 WI 81, ¶ 40 (“[C]ommunity caretaker and law enforcement
functions ‘are not mutually exclusive.’” (quoting Kramer, 2009 WI 14, ¶ 39)); Cady v.
Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441 (1973).
177. Pinkard, 2010 WI 81, ¶ 78 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
178. Kramer, 2009 WI 14, ¶ 35.
179. Pinkard, 2010 WI 81, ¶ 41 (citing Kramer, 2009 WI 14, ¶ 40).
180. Pinkard, 2010 WI 81, ¶ 42.
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doctrine with the community caretaking exception. “The community
caretak[ing] exception does not require the circumstances to rise to the
level of an emergency to qualify as an exception to the Fourth
182
Amendment’s warrant requirement.”
Wisconsin’s courts are still sorting out the boundaries of the
community caretaking exception. The court of appeals considers the
three-step test adopted by the Wisconsin Supreme Court to signify that
183
“warrantless entry into a residence is subjected to stricter scrutiny.” In
State v. Ultsch, the court of appeals used that stricter scrutiny standard
to hold that officers were not acting as community caretakers when they
entered a home without a warrant looking for a suspected drunk driver
184
While a
after finding her damaged car at the end of her driveway.
promising development, this holding did not stop officers from entering
185
Juan Gracia’s home under similar circumstances.
In that case, the
Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the community caretaking
exception applied to the officers’ entry of Gracia’s bedroom after Gracia
186
had told the officers to “go away.”
3. U.S. Supreme Court
The U.S. Supreme Court recognized the exception in Cady, but has
yet to endorse the elimination of the totally divorced standard or the
187
expansion from automobiles to private homes.
III. ANALYSIS
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181. Id. ¶ 26 n.8 (“We have consistently maintained the appropriate distinction between
the two exceptions . . . .”).
182. Id.
183. State v. Ultsch, 2011 WI App 17, ¶ 18, 331 Wis. 2d 242, 793 N.W.2d 505.
184. Id. ¶¶ 2–5, 30.
185. State v. Gracia, 2013 WI 15, ¶ 21, 345 Wis. 2d 488, 826 N.W.2d 87 (“[S]ome of the
facts here appear similar to those in Ultsch . . . .”).
186. Id. at ¶¶ 28–29.
187. Pinkard, 2010 WI 81, ¶ 98 (Bradley, J., dissenting) (“It is noteworthy that the
United States Supreme Court has never extended the community caretaker exception to
justify a warrantless entry of a home.”), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1001 (2011); Cady v.
Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441 (1973).
188. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
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Since then, the Supreme
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149
189

Court has not spoken on expanding the exception to homes.
Meanwhile, courts have fallen like dominoes as the expansion of
community caretaking has spread through American jurisprudence. In
190
In 1998, two states
1996, the Sixth Circuit expanded the exception.
191
expanded the exception: Virginia in March, followed by Maryland in
192
December. The Fourth Circuit, citing the decisions made in the Sixth
193
That
Circuit and Virginia, expanded community caretaking in 2001.
same year, California, following Maryland’s example, expanded the
194
195
exception.
The Eighth Circuit expanded the exception in 2006,
196
followed by South Dakota in 2009. Finally, in 2010, Wisconsin, citing
the examples of the Sixth Circuit, Virginia, and California, expanded the
197
community caretaking exception to cover warrantless home searches.
Where expansion of the community caretaking exception to homes
has occurred, it has happened quite rapidly. In Wisconsin, for example,
while the explicit expansion into homes did not occur until the Pinkard
198
case thirty-seven years after the Cady decision, the majority in Pinkard
relied on the decision in Bies v. State, which laid the groundwork for the
199
In the
home expansion only ten years after the Cady decision.
Commonwealth of Virginia, the community caretaking doctrine was not
used until 1994, but once recognized, it took only four years for a court
200
to use it to justify a warrantless home entry.
Not only have these expansions happened quickly, but it also seems
as if further expansion is inevitable. The Ninth Circuit, which initially
limited the doctrine to automobiles, recently signaled that it may be
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189. See supra note 187.
190. See supra notes 112, 118 and accompanying text.
191. See supra notes 142, 147 and accompanying text.
192. See supra notes 122, 127 and accompanying text.
193. See supra notes 148–55 and accompanying text.
194. See supra notes 127, 158–59 and accompanying text.
195. See supra notes 134, 140 and accompanying text.
196. See supra notes 164, 170–72 and accompanying text.
197. See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
198. See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
199. Pinkard, 2010 WI 81, ¶ 22 (“While Bies did not explicitly state that a bona fide
community caretaker function may support a warrantless home entry, it necessarily implies
such an interpretation.”); Bies v. State, 76 Wis. 2d 457, 251 N.W.2d 461 (1977). In Bies, an
officer investigating reports of noise in an alley observed, through an open door to a garage,
what he believed to be stolen goods. Bies, 76 Wis. 2d at 460–62. The majority in Pinkard
notes that this warrantless entry of the curtilage of the residence implies that a warrantless
entry of the home is allowed. Pinkard, 2010 WI 81, ¶ 22.
200. See supra notes 148–55 and accompanying text.
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201

moving toward expansion.
This rapid and growing expansion
threatens to erode Fourth Amendment rights. To counter this threat,
this expansion must be stopped and reversed.
Part III.A explains that the emergency doctrine is robust enough to
allow police to enter people’s homes when help is truly needed. Part
III.B shows that mere exigency cannot overcome the protections
guaranteed to people in their homes. Part III.C analyzes why warrants
prove to be an unworkable solution to this problem. Finally, Part III.D
calls for the Supreme Court to roll back the expansion of the community
caretaking exception by applying the recently revived “physical
intrusion” standard.
A. Community Caretaking in Homes Is Not Needed Because of the
Emergency Doctrine
Unquestionably, law enforcement may enter a home to render
202
assistance in a true emergency. That principle is the very essence of
the emergency doctrine, perhaps best expressed in 1963, by then-Judge
Warren Burger:
[A] warrant is not required to break down a door to enter a
burning home to rescue occupants or extinguish a fire, to prevent
a shooting or to bring emergency aid to an injured person. The
need to protect or preserve life or avoid serious injury is
justification for what would be otherwise illegal absent an
203
exigency or emergency.
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201. Although the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Erickson held that the community
caretaking function “cannot itself justify a warrantless search of a private residence,” United
States v. Erickson, 991 F.2d 529, 531 (9th Cir. 1993), a more recent decision points in a
different direction, United States v. Stafford, 416 F.3d 1068, 1073 (9th Cir. 2005) (explaining
that police acting as community caretakers responding to “perceived emergenc[ies]” could
enter a residence without a warrant). This opinion is shared by the Fourth Circuit, which
recently interpreted Stafford as allowing warrantless searches of homes under the community
caretaking doctrine: “[S]ome lower courts have relied on the community caretaking rationale
in upholding warrantless searches of homes.” Hunsberger v. Wood, 570 F.3d 546, 553 (4th
Cir. 2009).
202. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392 (1978) (“We do not question the right of the
police to respond to emergency situations.”).
203. Wayne v. United States, 318 F.2d 205, 212 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
204. See supra notes 103–04 and accompanying text.
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While community caretaking often involves some exigency, it usually
204
does not involve the urgency required in emergency situations. Some
courts separate exigency and emergency, reserving the emergency
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doctrine for “actual emergencies,” whereas other courts have been
205
confused on this point, sometimes conflating the two. For example, in
2012, the Supreme Court of Ohio referred to the “communitycaretaking/emergency-aid exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant
206
requirement,” and in 2013, the New Jersey Supreme Court granted a
motion for appeal to bring clarity to “state case law [that had] blurred
the distinction between the community-caretaking and emergency-aid
207
Other courts graft the emergency doctrine onto the
doctrines.”
community caretaking exception by applying the Mitchell test to limit
208
the exception to emergency situations. New Mexico’s history with the
community caretaker exception brings some clarity to this mess and
shows that when the emergency doctrine is properly applied, the
community caretaking exception does not need to be expanded to
209
homes.
In 2001, the New Mexico Court of Appeals referred to “community
caretaking”
and
“emergency
aid”
as
“different
210
Initially, the
characterizations . . . essentially of the same activity.”
205. See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
206. State v. Dunn, 964 N.E.2d 1037, 1042 (Ohio 2012). In the same case, the court
implies that “community caretaking,” “exigent circumstances,” and “emergency” are similar,
if not the same:
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In State v. Applegate, this court upheld a warrantless entry into a residence by police
officers who, while responding to a report of domestic violence, heard sounds
coming from inside the residence indicative of violence. Although we did not use
the term “community caretaking,” but rather “exigent circumstances,” we held that
the warrantless entry was certainly justified by the officers’ reasonable belief that
entering the residence was necessary to investigate an emergency threatening life
and limb.
Id. at 1041–42. (citation omitted). The court further conflates community caretaking and the
emergency doctrine by claiming that the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the community
caretaking exception in Mincey v. Arizona, which is actually the case that gave rise to the
emergency doctrine. Id. at 1041 (“The United States Supreme Court further elaborated on
the community-caretaking exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement in
Mincey v. Arizona . . . .”); see also Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 395 (1978); Mary
Elisabeth Naumann, Note, The Community Caretaker Doctrine: Yet Another Fourth
Amendment Exception, 26 AM. J. CRIM. L. 325, 331 (1999) (“In Mincey v. Arizona, the
Supreme Court recognized an exception to the warrant requirement for emergencies.”).
207. State v. Vargas, 63 A.3d 175, 188 (N.J. 2013) (rejecting an expansion of the
community caretaking exception to allow warrantless searches of homes).
208. See Michael R. Dimino, Sr., Police Paternalism: Community Caretaking, Assistance
Searches, and Fourth Amendment Reasonableness, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1485, 1503–04
(2009). For an explanation of the Mitchell test, see supra notes 84–86 and accompanying text.
209. See infra notes 211–16 and accompanying text.
210. State v. Nemeth, 23 P.3d 936, 943 (N.M. Ct. App. 2001), overruled by State v. Ryon,
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108 P.3d 1032 (N.M. 2005).
211. Nemeth, 23 P.3d at 944.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 945 (“[L]aw enforcement officials have no carte blanche to enter homes to
investigate circumstances of suspected criminal activity under a guise or pretext of community
caretaking pursuits.”).
214. State v. Ryon, 108 P.3d 1032, 1041–42 (N.M. 2005) (“The decision in Nemeth to
conflate the emergency assistance doctrine with the broader community caretaker exception
and hold that officers were merely performing a welfare check or ‘public service’ is
understandable, but we are not persuaded the decision is appropriate.”).
215. Id. at 1041 (emphasis added).
216. Id. at 1043.
217. Id. at 1048.
218. Id. at 1044.
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court held that the community caretaking function “can properly take its
place in our jurisprudence as an exception to the Fourth Amendment
211
warrant requirement.” The court allowed for warrantless searches of a
home under the community caretaking exception as long as police
officers’ actions are “objectively reasonable” and officers are “not
212
Although the court of appeals
engaged in crime-solving activities.”
213
signaled a cautious approach to the expansion, the New Mexico
214
Supreme Court rolled it back just four years later.
The court was
concerned that “Nemeth does not convey the urgency required to make
a warrantless intrusion into a home, even to provide emergency
215
assistance, reasonable.”
The court distinguished between the emergency doctrine, which it
held applies to personal residences, and “[t]he Cady community
caretaker or public servant doctrine,” which it held applied primarily to
216
vehicles. It rejected community caretaking as a basis to enter a home
without a warrant and held that police “may [only] enter a home
without a warrant or consent pursuant to the emergency assistance
217
doctrine.” The court also held that officers’ “actions must be in good
faith . . . for a purpose consistent with community caretaking, rather
than as a pretext for investigating criminal activity or searching for
incriminating evidence” and adopted the Mitchell test for evaluating
218
such entries.
Courts truly seeking to limit warrantless home searches to
emergency situations would do well to follow the lead of the New
Mexico Supreme Court. Such searches should be evaluated using the
emergency aid doctrine—not community caretaking—because “only a
genuine emergency will justify entering and searching a home without a
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219

warrant and without consent or knowledge.”
As this Comment
examines below, anything less is not sufficient to guard that which
220
stands at the core of people’s Fourth Amendment rights—their homes.
B. Non-Emergency Exigencies Cannot Overcome the Protection
Afforded to Homes
An exception founded on the “constitutional difference between
221
houses and [automobiles]”
should not now be used to justify
warrantless entry into homes, which are “accorded the full range of
222
Fourth Amendment protections.” “[The] physical entry of the home is
the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is
223
directed . . . .”
Accordingly, when “officers are not responding to an
emergency,” searching a home without a warrant requires “compelling
224
Unlike homes,
reasons” and “exceptional circumstances.”
automobiles have an “ambulatory character” and “the extent of policecitizen contact involving automobiles will be substantially greater than
225
Thus, people have a “lesser
police-citizen contact in a home.”
226
expectation of privacy in an automobile than in [a] home,” where they
227
However, this distinction
have the greatest expectation of privacy.
seems to be lost on jurisdictions where the community caretaking
228
exception is not limited to emergency situations.
Warrantless searches in those jurisdictions are justified with a blend
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219. Id. at 1043 (citing Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392 (1978)).
220. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961).
221. Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 439 (1973) (quoting Chambers v. Maroney, 399
U.S. 42, 52 (1970)).
222. Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 211 (1966).
223. United States v. U.S. Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972).
224. McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 454 (1948).
225. Cady, 413 U.S. at 441–42.
226. State v. Pinkard, 2010 WI 81, ¶ 56, 327 Wis. 2d 346, 785 N.W.2d 592 (quoting State
v. Anderson, 142 Wis. 2d 162, 169 n.4, 417 N.W.2d 411, 414 n.4 (Ct. App. 1987) (internal
quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1001 (2011).
227. Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1414 (2013) (“But when it comes to the Fourth
Amendment, the home is first among equals.”); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 589 (1980)
(“The Fourth Amendment protects the individual’s privacy in a variety of settings. In none is
the zone of privacy more clearly defined than when bounded by the unambiguous physical
dimensions of an individual’s home . . . .”); Gooding v. United States, 416 U.S. 430, 462 (1974)
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (“[T]here is no expectation of privacy more . . . demanding of
constitutional protection than our right to expect that we will be let alone in the privacy of
our homes . . . .”).
228. See infra notes 229–35 and accompanying text.
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229

of exigency and reasonableness, which should not be sufficient to
overcome the heightened constitutional protections that people enjoy in
230
their homes.
In California, community caretaking searches must be
prompted by exigency, but law enforcement’s actions are judged against
231
the malleable reasonableness standard.
In Wisconsin, the
reasonableness of officers’ exercise of their community caretaking
function is determined with a balancing test that considers, among other
232
In Maryland, the exigency required is that law
things, exigency.
233
The
enforcement must be protecting people, property, or both.
standard for evaluating officers’ actions is “whether they possessed a
234
reasonable basis for doing what they did.” These standards offer the
promise of sufficient protection, but they are often used to justify a
235
search when circumstances are, in reality, less than exigent.
Consider, for example, Pinkard, the case Wisconsin used to expand
community caretaking, where police received a report that the
occupants of a home were sleeping near illegal drugs, but officers had no
indication that the occupants were in need of medical attention or other
236
If the police were concerned for the occupants, that
assistance.
concern was not reflected in their actions; the police gang unit, not an
237
ambulance, was dispatched to check on the occupants. It was not until
the Wisconsin Supreme Court heard the case that the concern that the
occupants might be suffering a drug overdose was discussed as a
238
In a
possible exigency—raised not by the police but by the court.
more egregious example, one law enforcement officer lied to another to
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229. Recall that the exigencies discussed here are not the same as the exigencies in a
situation where a crime is being investigated. That “exigent circumstances” exception is a
separate issue from community caretaking. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
230. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
231. See supra Part II.C.2.c. This combination of lower standards makes the exception
subject to abuse by law enforcement. See Jennifer Fink, Note, People v. Ray: The Fourth
Amendment and the Community Caretaking Exception, 35 U.S.F. L. Rev. 135, 152 (2000)
(“The Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement is intended to curb the potential for abuses
of discretion by police officers, and the community caretaking exception will likely defeat this
critical purpose when applied in the context of a private residence.”).
232. See supra notes 173–82 and accompanying text.
233. State v. Alexander, 721 A.2d 275, 284 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1998).
234. Id. at 285.
235. See, e.g., United States v. Quezada, 448 F.3d 1005, 1006–08 (8th Cir. 2006).
236. See supra notes 17–20 and accompanying text.
237. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
238. State v. Pinkard, 2010 WI 81, ¶¶ 90–91, 327 Wis. 2d 346, 785 N.W.2d 592 (Bradley,
J., dissenting), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1001 (2011).
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create the exigent circumstances later used to justify the search that
239
served as the basis for expanding the exception for the Fourth Circuit.
In the Third Circuit, the standard itself has a low threshold—the
240
In practice, the exigency and
“modified exigent circumstances test.”
reasonableness standards simply do not provide a level of protection
appropriate to homes.
C. Community Caretaking Warrants Are Not a Workable Solution
Community caretaking warrants are a recently proposed solution to
241
the problem of the expanding community caretaking exception. These
242
warrants would be based on administrative warrants, which are used
for health and safety inspections and are issued using a reasonableness
243
standard. At first blush, this proposal seems to make sense. Both the
community caretaking exception and administrative warrants came
about because the courts perceived a need for law enforcement to enter
244
However, deeper
homes for reasons apart from crime investigation.
analysis reveals that warrants are not a workable solution to the
problem of the community caretaking expansion: Warrants would be
unnecessary in emergencies, their nature is incompatible with the
concept of community caretaking, and they could lead to police
performing traditional searches without showing probable cause.
In jurisdictions that combine the emergency doctrine with
245
246
community caretaking, or limit the exception to emergencies,
community caretaking warrants would serve no purpose because the
247
emergency doctrine is itself an exception to the warrant requirement.
It is well established that law enforcement officers can enter homes to
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239. See supra Part II.C.1.b.
240. Ray v. Twp. of Warren, 626 F.3d 170, 176 (3d Cir. 2010). Courts do not rely on the
community caretaking doctrine per se, but “instead apply what appears to be a modified
exigent circumstances test, with perhaps a lower threshold for exigency if the officer is acting
in a community caretaking role.” Id.
241. See Marinos, supra note 28, at 284–89 (proposing a “community caretaking
warrant” as a solution to “unreasonable police intrusions”).
242. Id.
243. See supra Part II.B.2.
244. See supra Part II.B.2 (explaining the development of administrative warrants to
allow agents to enter a home to perform health and safety inspections); supra Part II.B.3
(explaining the development of the community caretaking exception that allowed police to
enter a home to protect people and property).
245. See supra note 206 and accompanying text.
246. See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
247. See supra Part II.B.1.
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give emergency aid or to prevent imminent harm.
In such cases, a
warrant requirement defies common sense: If the officers can wait for a
249
warrant, the situation is not an emergency. But, even in jurisdictions
where community caretaking is kept distinct from the emergency
doctrine, warrants are not a workable solution.
Considering first the nature of warrants, this Comment finds it
incompatible with the concept of community caretaking. While
administrative warrants are not used to investigate crimes per se, their
250
purpose is to seek out violations of the law. For example, in Camara,
inspectors were seeking entry to a home to search for violations of San
251
Francisco’s housing code.
Administrative warrants are undeniably
investigatory in nature and thus contrary to the concept of community
caretaking, which, as the name implies, is about taking care of people
252
The community
and property and not about investigating crime.
caretaking expansion is a problem that needs fixing, but warrants are
not the right tool for the job.
Even if one were to look past this incompatibility and, arguendo,
choose the wrong tool for the right job, there is a larger concern. The
253
lower standard required for the issuance of these warrants, coupled
254
with the lack of analysis of officers’ subjective intent and a tolerance of
255
pretext in the courts, could allow the police to use these proposed
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248. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
249. This concept further illustrates the point that community caretaking does not need
to be expanded to homes to cover emergency situations and underscores the wisdom of the
New Mexico Supreme Court, which distinguished between community caretaking and the
emergency doctrine. See supra notes 210–18 and accompanying text.
250. See supra Part II.B.2.
251. Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 525–26 (1967).
252. While some courts may have blurred Cady’s totally divorced standard, it remains at
the heart of the exception. See supra notes 121, 127, 171 and accompanying text.
253. See supra notes 242–43 and accompanying text.
254. The Supreme Court has consistently refused to consider the relevancy of officers’
subjective motivations. “Our cases have repeatedly rejected this approach. An action is
‘reasonable’ under the Fourth Amendment, regardless of the individual officer’s state of
mind, ‘as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify [the] action.’” Brigham City v.
Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 404 (2006) (alteration in original) (quoting Scott v. United States, 436
U.S. 128, 138 (1978)). “The officer’s subjective motivation is irrelevant.” Brigham City, 547
U.S. at 404 (citing Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 338 n.2 (2000)). Particularly relevant
to a discussion on community caretaking is this quote from the same case: “It therefore does
not matter here—even if their subjective motives could be so neatly unraveled—whether the
officers entered the kitchen to arrest respondents and gather evidence against them or to
assist the injured and prevent further violence.” Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 405.
255. See supra notes 236–39 and accompanying text.
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warrants to investigate without probable cause. Like criminal search
warrants, administrative warrants are issued to allow agents into
people’s homes, but a reasonableness standard takes the place of the
256
Under a community caretaking
higher standard of probable cause.
warrant, if the need to enter the home to render aid outweighed the
invasion caused by entering the home, then the search would be
257
This
considered reasonable and the warrant would be granted.
standard for issuance sounds innocuous, but it could easily be subject to
abuse, especially in jurisdictions that do not preserve the totally
258
Under a community caretaking
divorced standard from Cady.
warrant, it is the officers’ community caretaking motive and not their
investigative motive, if any, that would be evaluated by the
259
reasonableness standard. However, the investigative motives are still
there and in reality could be the driving force for the officers’ warrant
260
request. To obtain a warrant, officers would simply have to articulate
an “objectively reasonable” belief that community caretaking is
261
necessary in order to enter a home ; for example, the oft-cited
262
unanswered knock at the door.
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256. Harper, supra note 99, at 21 (“Camara in effect replaced probable cause with a
reasonableness standard for administrative inspections by a balance of societal interests and
needs versus a slight invasion of individual privacy.”).
257. See Marinos, supra note 28, at 285.
258. See supra Parts II.C.1.c, II.2.C.a, II.2.C.e. Also note that prior to the expansion of
the exception from automobiles to homes, scholars warned of the potential for abuse. See,
e.g., Edwin J. Butterfoss, Bright Line Seizures: The Need for Clarity in Determining When
Fourth Amendment Activity Begins, 79 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 437, 471 (1988) (“Of
course, there is some danger that the police will attempt to use the ‘community caretaking
function’ as a pretext for the stop of a suspect to take advantage of the more relaxed seizure
standard for such encounters.”).
259. If the investigative motive were to be evaluated, it would be under the standard of
probable cause normally used for criminal search warrants. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213,
235–36 (1983) (discussing that during the criminal warrant process, a judge should issue a
warrant based on probable cause, and he should make the decision whether there is probable
cause based on common sense).
260. For example, in Pinkard, police received a tip about people sleeping in an
apartment near drugs and money, thought it “sounded like a drug house,” and sent a gang
unit to investigate. Brief of Plaintiff-Respondent, supra note 18, at 7; see also supra notes 17–
20 and accompanying text. Police later claimed to have been concerned that the people could
have been suffering from an overdose, yet the actions of police (sending in a gang unit)
indicate they were taking down a drug house. See supra notes 17–20, 238 and accompanying
text. The search of the home was upheld by the Wisconsin Supreme Court as a valid exercise
of community caretaking. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
261. See supra text accompanying note 177.
262. See supra notes 20, 115, 135 and accompanying text.

34306-mqt_97-1 Sheet No. 83 Side B

01/13/2014 11:22:05

HELDING 10 (DO NOT DELETE)

158

12/3/2013 1:58 PM

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[97:1

C M
Y K

01/13/2014 11:22:05

263. See People v. Ray, 981 P.2d 928, 944 (Cal. 1999) (Mosk, J., dissenting).
264. See State v. Gracia, 2013 WI 15, ¶ 25, 345 Wis. 2d 488, 826 N.W.2d 87 (“If Gracia
had been seriously injured in the accident, quick medical assistance would have been
necessary.”).
265. See State v. Pinkard, 2010 WI 81, ¶¶ 39–40, 327 Wis. 2d 346, 785 N.W.2d 592, cert.
denied, 131 S. Ct. 1001 (2011).
266. Gracia, 2013 WI 15, ¶ 8.
267. Pinkard, 2010 WI 81, ¶ 91 (Bradley, J., dissenting). While the officers testified that
they had some level of concern, “there is nothing in the record indicating that Officer Lopez
articulated anything about how or why he was concerned.” Id. ¶ 84.
268. Id. at ¶ 87.
269. See infra notes 270–71 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 264–68.
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Absent an emergency and its accompanying indicators, an
unanswered knock at the door could signify any number of things,
including: the occupant needs assistance, the occupant is not home, the
occupant cannot hear the knocking, the occupant is in the backyard, or
263
the occupant does not wish to answer the door. Is it really objectively
reasonable to believe the unanswered knock signifies only the first
option? It is difficult to posit the set of facts that would: (a) provide the
objectively reasonable belief that someone needs help, and (b) allow
time to wait for a warrant. This objection is similar to the objection to
community caretaking warrants in emergency situations. The difference
is that concerns that do not rise to the level of an emergency can wait.
Still, some courts, unconcerned with officers’ subjective motivations,
warn that police cannot wait. For example, in State v. Gracia, the
Wisconsin Supreme Court notes that if the defendant had been
264
“seriously injured,” he would have needed medical attention. And, in
State v. Pinkard, it was the court that was concerned that officers could
265
be prevented from assisting victims of a drug overdose.
Yet, the
officers on the scene in Gracia showed so little concern for Gracia’s
condition that they were prepared to leave after they were initially
266
Similarly, the officers in Pinkard “never
unable to locate him.
267
articulated any concern about the possibility of an overdose,” and they
268
brought no medical personnel with them to the home.
Courts have
raised the specter of tragedies potentially allowed to happen because of
police not entering a home, even though the facts of the cases that
269
generated these warnings are the best arguments against them.
In some cases, the justifications provided by officers for community
caretaking searches are obvious pretext. For example, in Gracia and
Pinkard, officers’ actions on the scene did not match up with their laterarticulated concerns about the medical conditions of the defendants in
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270

those cases. Similarly, in Michigan v. Fisher, the police claimed to be
concerned about blood trails, yet they did not contact medical
271
personnel.
Considering that courts tolerated the naked pretext in
these cases, it is not an unfounded concern that such pretext could be
the basis for warrants issued by courts under the lesser standard of
reasonableness. If such warrants were issued in jurisdictions where
mixed motive caretaking were allowed, police could effectively obtain
criminal search warrants using a standard normally required for health
272
and safety inspections.
Warrants will not work to solve the problem of an expanded
community caretaking exception. Absent an emergency, in which case a
warrant is not required, it is unnecessary for the police to enter a home
immediately to render assistance. If officers also suspect a crime, then
they are free to get a warrant on that basis and should do so—using the
273
proper standard of probable cause. If police are unable to meet that
standard, it may be inconvenient for them, but that is why the Fourth
Amendment was adopted in the first place. With or without warrants,
community caretaking searches of homes present a serious threat to
Fourth Amendment rights.
D. It Is Time to Roll Back the Expansion
The U.S. Supreme Court has warned that too narrow a view of
Fourth Amendment rights can lead to a slow and steady erosion of
274
In other words, as Wisconsin Supreme Court Justice
those rights.
275
Bradley feared, yesterday’s close call has become today’s norm.
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It may be that it is the obnoxious thing in its mildest and least repulsive form; but
illegitimate and unconstitutional practices get their first footing in that way, namely,
by silent approaches and slight deviations from legal modes of procedure. This can
only be obviated by adhering to the rule that constitutional provisions for the
security of person and property should be liberally construed.
Id. at 635 (emphasis added).
275. See State v. Pinkard, 2010 WI 81, ¶ 66, 327 Wis. 2d 346, 785 N.W.2d 592 (Bradley,
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270. See supra note 266 and accompanying text.
271. Michigan v. Fisher, 558 U.S. 45, 550 (2009) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (finding “the
police decision to leave the scene and not return for several hours—without resolving any
potentially dangerous situation and without calling for medical assistance—inconsistent with
a reasonable belief that Fisher was in need of immediate aid”).
272. Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 535–36 (1967).
273. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
274. See, e.g., Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886). In 1886, the Court
warned:
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Community caretaking, once a limited exception, has, through the
276
malleable standard of reasonableness, greatly expanded. The seeds of
this expansion are seen in the Cady decision, which spawned the
277
Immediately after explaining that
community caretaking exception.
community caretaking is “totally divorced” from the “acquisition of
evidence,” the Court pointed out that a warrantless search of a vehicle
could be reasonable to prevent the removal or destruction of evidence
even if the possibility of such removal or destruction was “remote, if not
278
Community caretaking itself is arguably an expansion
nonexistent.”
279
and weakening of the exigent circumstances test.
This Comment shares Wisconsin Supreme Court Justice Prosser’s
recent concern that the “exception is now being stretched and extended
280
even more.”
Not only has the community caretaking exception
expanded to homes, but its protective limits have been stretched and
281
weakened over time. When the Wisconsin Supreme Court expanded
community caretaking, it also weakened the totally divorced standard
282
set in Cady.
Its view is that the U.S. Supreme Court was simply
“noting that many police-citizen encounters have nothing to do with
crime, not [as] requiring that they must have nothing to do with
283
The exception is stretched further because pretext is now
crime.”
284
This new
tolerated and even sometimes provided by the courts.
tolerance—one might say encouragement—of naked pretext is the most
dangerous aspect of allowing the community caretaking exception to
cover warrantless home searches. If mere silence can reasonably
indicate a person in need of medical attention, whether one knows
someone is present or not, then a simple unanswered knock on the door
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J., dissenting) (“I fear that today’s close call will become tomorrow’s norm.”), cert. denied,
131 S. Ct. 1001 (2011).
276. See supra Part II.C.
277. See generally supra Part I.
278. See Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441–42 (1973).
279. See supra note 240.
280. State v. Gracia, 2013 WI 15, ¶ 70, 345 Wis. 2d 488, 826 N.W.2d 87 (Prosser, J.,
dissenting) (“What appeared to some members of the Pinkard court as a significant departure
from the core principles of the exception is now being stretched and extended even more.”).
281. See supra notes 176–82 and accompanying text.
282. See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
283. State v. Kramer, 2009 WI 14, ¶ 35, 315 Wis. 2d 414, 759 N.W.2d 598 (alteration in
original) (quoting People v. Cordero, 830 N.E.2d 830, 841 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) (O’Malley, J.,
concurring)).
284. See supra notes 236–39 and accompanying text.
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by police becomes an exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant
285
requirement. Suspicion of drug activity, combined with an after-thefact concern about an overdose, becomes all that is needed for police to
286
make a warrantless home entry. Furthermore, if drugs are uncovered
during those warrantless entries, it is unlikely a court will find the
287
searches unreasonable.
The U.S. Supreme Court must act to roll back this expanded and
weakened exception. There is reason to believe that it may do so in the
near future. In 2006, the Court granted certiorari in Brigham City to
resolve a circuit split on another Fourth Amendment exception—the
288
emergency doctrine —and, in 2012, it clarified the Brigham City
289
In 2013, the Court settled two more Fourth
decision in Ryburn.
290
Amendment questions in Missouri v. McNeely
and Florida v.
291
Jardinnes. Resolving Fourth Amendment conflicts remains an area of
active interest for the Court, and community caretaking needs to be
292
addressed.
As more jurisdictions contribute to “the hair-splitting
distinctions that currently plague our Fourth Amendment
293
jurisprudence,” it is more likely that the Court will have to sort out the
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285. See Fink, supra note 231, at 153.
286. State v. Pinkard, 2010 WI 81, ¶ 92, 327 Wis. 2d 346, 785 N.W.2d 592 (Bradley, J.,
dissenting) (“[A]n unarticulated concern about the possibility of an overdose can always be
later invoked by a court when officers arrive at what they think is a ‘drug house.’”), cert.
denied, 131 S. Ct. 1001 (2011).
287. See Dimino, supra note 208, at 1499–500 (“A malleable standard in Fourth
Amendment cases presents a particular danger that it will be practically difficult to declare
unreasonable a search that has resulted in the seizure of evidence proving a defendant’s
guilt.”). But see Scalia, supra note 62, at 1181–82 (speculating that what constitutes a
reasonable search is left to judges because “we do not trust juries to answer the . . . question
dispassionately when an obviously guilty defendant is in the dock”).
288. Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 402 (2006) (“We granted certiorari in light of
differences among state courts and the Courts of Appeals concerning the appropriate Fourth
Amendment standard governing warrantless entry by law enforcement in an emergency
situation.” (citations omitted)).
289. See Ryburn v. Huff, 132 S. Ct. 987, 990 (2012) (per curiam).
290. Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1556 (2013) (holding that the dissipation of
alcohol in the blood is not a per se exigency).
291. See supra note 57.
292. See David L. Hudson, Courts In a Muddle Over 4th Amendment’s Community
Caretaking Exception, ABA JOURNAL (Aug. 1, 2013, 3:09 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/
magazine/article/courts_in_a_muddle_over_4th_amendments_community_caretaking_excepti
on/; Nicholas J. Wagoner, New Exception Allowing Warrantless Home Entries Headed to the
High Court?, CIRCUIT SPLITS (Jan. 6, 2012, 7:00 AM), http://www.circuitsplits.com/2012/01/anew-exception-to-warrantless-searches-of-the-home.html.
293. New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 663–64 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
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294

mess.
The decisions in Jones and Jardines provide a roadmap, which the
Court should use to resolve the conflict over the community caretaking
295
exception when it finally reaches the high court.
The reach of the
reasonableness standard has exceeded its grasp. While reasonableness
initially added to people’s Fourth Amendment protections, it is now at
296
the point where it is taking those protections away. The Court began
to correct this problem in Jones, continued to do so in Jardines, and
297
should do so again with a case on the community caretaking exception.
The Court must confine the community caretaking exception to
automobiles and people outside of their homes. The expansion into
homes should be halted and reversed.
Jones “provide[d] the foundation for a paradigm shift in the
298
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment.” Until Jones, searches were
299
evaluated solely in light of the reasonable expectation test.
After
Jones, physical intrusion has been reinvigorated as a protector of the
300
Fourth Amendment. Jardines built on the foundation laid in Jones by
301
applying the physical intrusion test to the home. The expansion of the
community caretaking exception to the home is entirely about physical
intrusion. The physical intrusion of placing a device on the underside of
302
an automobile, rejected in Jones, and the sniffing nose of a dog on a
303
porch, rejected in Jardines, are arguably much less intrusive than a
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294. See MacDonald v. Town of Eastham, No. 12-12061-RGS, 2013 WL 2303760 at *5
(D. Mass. May 24, 2013) (explaining that when “[f]aced with [both the] absence of controlling
authority and conflicting precedent” about whether community caretaking applied to home
entries, officers who entered a home “would not have known whether [their] actions violated
[the occupant’s] Fourth Amendment rights” and were thus entitled to qualified immunity
against a § 1983 action); Hudson, supra note 292 (highlighting the confusion among the courts
and noting that “the Supreme Court may need to wade into the troubled waters of
community caretaking to explain the concept it identified 40 years ago”).
295. Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409 (2013); United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945
(2012).
296. See supra notes 66–70 and accompanying text.
297. See supra notes 53–59 and accompanying text.
298. Erica Goldberg, How United States v. Jones Can Restore Our Faith in the Fourth
Amendment, 110 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 62, 62 (Mar. 2011), http://www.michigan
lawreview.org/assets/fi/110/Goldberg.pdf.
299. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
300. See supra notes 54–56 and accompanying text.
301. See Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1417–18 (2013).
302. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 948, 954 (2012).
303. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1417–18.
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police officer actually entering a home. If the mere placement of a
device on the exterior of a car, or a dog sniffing from a porch are
physical trespasses, a fortiori police officers’ physical entry into the
interior of a home must be a trespass. The Court has applied the
physical intrusion test to a car and to the curtilage of the home, surely it
304
is ready to apply it to the threshold of the home.
Jones and Jardines are clearly based on an originalist interpretation
305
of the Fourth Amendment. Fortunately, homes are places that both
originalist “physical intrusion” justices and “expectation of privacy”
justices agree deserve substantial protection:
In none is the zone of privacy more clearly defined than when
bounded by the unambiguous physical dimensions of an
individual’s home—a zone that finds its roots in clear and
specific constitutional terms: “The right of the people to be
306
secure in their . . . houses . . . shall not be violated.”
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304. See Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1415; Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 951–52.
305. In Jardines, Justice Scalia discusses the historical definition of curtilage from 1769.
Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1415 (citing WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS
OF ENGLAND 225 (1769)); see also Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 950 (“At bottom, we must ‘assur[e]
preservation of that degree of privacy against government that existed when the Fourth
Amendment was adopted.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S.
27, 34 (2001))).
306. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 589 (1980) (alteration in original) (emphasis
added) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. IV).
307. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 951 n.5.
308. Id. at 954 (“There is no precedent for the proposition that whether a search has
occurred depends on the nature of the crime being investigated.”).
309. Id. at 953 (“[W]e do not make trespass the exclusive test. Situations involving
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Denying the expansion based on “physical intrusion” would allow the
originalist members of the Court to continue to expand that rationale,
while the others could deny the expansion based on the privacy
expectations people hold in their homes.
One potential obstacle to such a ruling is the Jones decision’s
requirement that “[t]respass alone does not qualify” as a search; the
trespass must be combined with “an attempt to find something or to
307
obtain information.” However, once the police enter a home with an
investigatory purpose, what it is the police are investigating is
308
irrelevant. Moreover, despite this recent resurgence of the trespassory
test, Jones does not replace Katz and the existing elements of Fourth
309
Amendment jurisprudence. “[A]n unconsented police entry . . . into a
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residential unit” is still a search.
Additionally, common instances of
community caretaking—looking for potentially injured persons,
checking into what appears to be a burglary, or investigating strange
311
smells or noises—arguably have some investigatory purpose and could
reasonably meet that requirement of the Jones search test.
IV. CONCLUSION
Fourth Amendment rights have proven as malleable as the
reasonableness standard once invoked by the courts to protect them.
312
To reSteady hammering over the years has weakened them both.
strengthen Fourth Amendment rights, the U.S. Supreme Court must
reshape the community caretaking exception using the stronger physical
intrusion standard. If it does not, people’s homes, in which they once
had their strongest Fourth Amendment protections, will offer no greater
refuge than their automobiles. This result cannot be what the Framers
had in mind when guaranteeing to all Americans the “right . . . to be
313
secure in their [homes].”
In 1759, thirty years before the Fourth Amendment was proposed,
Richard Jackson said, “Those who would give up essential Liberty, to
purchase a little temporary Safety, deserve neither Liberty nor
314
Safety.” Whether we deserve it or not, the trend is that once we give
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merely the transmission of electronic signals without trespass would remain subject to Katz
analysis.”).
310. See LAFAVE, supra note 38, § 2.3(b).
311. See supra notes 103–04, 114, 129, 156, 165–66 and accompanying text.
312. See supra notes 66–71 and accompanying text.
313. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (emphasis added). The Fourth Amendment was adopted
partially in response to “general warrants,” which were common at the time and “exposed
any person or property to seizure ‘in the most arbitrary manner.’” WILLIAM J. CUDDIHY,
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: ORIGINS AND ORIGINAL MEANING 602–1791, 684 (2009)
(quoting Statement of Governor Patrick Henry, in the Virginia Ratifying Convention (June
24, 1788), in 3 DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 588 (Jonathan Elliot ed., Washington D.C., 2d ed. 1836)
[hereinafter DEBATES]); see also Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1981 (2013) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (quoting DEBATES, supra note 313, at 588) (“Patrick Henry warned that the new
Federal Constitution [without the Fourth Amendment] would expose the citizenry to
searches and seizures ‘in the most arbitrary manner, without any evidence or reason.’”).
314. RICHARD JACKSON, AN HISTORICAL REVIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION AND
GOVERNMENT OF PENSYLVANIA 289 (London, Printed for R. Griffiths 1759) (emphasis
omitted). Many people incorrectly attribute this sentiment to Benjamin Franklin, but he was
not its author. 3 BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, THE WORKS OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 124–26 & n.1
(John Bigelow ed., New York, G.P. Putnam’s Sons 1887).
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up liberty for safety, we receive neither. By expanding the community
caretaking exception, in the name of safety, courts have given up our
liberties. Under the cover of reasonableness, the courts have hammered
our malleable Fourth Amendment liberties into a new shape—one that
would be unfamiliar to those who drafted and adopted that amendment.
The Court must take control before the hammering shatters those
liberties, leaving the people of this country with mere fragments of a
once robust constitutional guarantee.
GREGORY T. HELDING*
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315. See, e.g., Massimo Calabresi & Michael Crowley, Homeland Insecurity: After
Boston, The Struggle Between Liberty and Security, TIME MAGAZINE, May 13, 2013, at 22,
24–28. Despite an October 2011 grant of new surveillance powers to FBI agents to fight
domestic terrorism, domestic terrorists were still able to strike the Boston Marathon in 2013.
Id. at 24.
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